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Foreword 
This book is the result of the international conference "EU Counter-Terrorism 
0:ffences: What Impact on National Legislation and Case-law?" organised by ECLAN 
(European Criminal Law Academic Network) and the Institute for European Studies 
(Universite Libre de Bruxelles) on 27-28 May 2011. This event took place in the 
framework of the project ECLAN II which has been carried out with the financial 
support of the European Commission (DG Justice ), of the Ministry of Justice of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and of the Institute for European Studies (Universite 
Libre de Bruxelles). The publication of this volume is funded by the Ministry of 
Justice ofthe Grand Duchy ofLuxembourg. 
The editors would like to express their gratitude to all those who were involved in 
the preparation of the conference, particularly Emanuela Politi and Serge de Biolley. 
Special thanks are also due to Julian Hale for his help in the language proofreading of 
some chapters of the book. 
The two Framework Decisions 
A critical approach 1 
Sabine GLEss 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism is a very serious challenge in many ways, not only for people, but also 
for the fundamental principles of democracies bound to the rule of law. When for 
instance, in spring 2011 special US agents :finally tracked down Osama Bin Laden 
and killed him, the execution set off a heated debate among lawyers: was this a legal 
execution, a justi:fied action of killing a combat in a war against terrorists? Or are 
terrorists vested with all the rights of a criminal suspect 2, and thus certainly must be 
captured, out on trial and not killed? 
Seven years before, Klaus Tolksdorf, the current president of the German 
Bundesgerichtshof declared: "Tue fight against terrorism cannot be a wild, unjust 
war" and ordered a retrial of Mounir el-Motassadeq, the only person successfully 
prosecuted for involvement in the September 11 attacks 3• These attacks, as it is well 
known, have dramatically altered the context of discussions about fighting terrorism, 
1 Parts of this contribution have been inspired by Cyrille Fijnaut's work; see S. GLESS, 
"Fighting Terrorism in a "Rechtsstaat", in T. S;A.PENS, M. GROENHUIJSEN and T. KoorJMANNs 
(eds.), Antwerpen/Cambridge, Intersentia, 2011, ·p. 929-940. I wish to thank Dario Stagno and 
Claudine Abt, who have provided valuable help researching facts and editing the text. 
2 K · AMBos, "Terrorists Have Rights Too - What International Law Says about the 
Killing of Bin Laden", Spiegel Online, 2011, at http://www.spiegel.de/internationaV 
world/0,1518,762417,00.html; see also E. GUILn, "Tue Uses andAbuses ofCounter-Terrorism 
Policies in Europe: Tue Case ofthe 'Terrorist Lists"', JCMS, 2008, p. 173-193, at p. 184-188. 
3 New York Times, 5 March 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/05/world/german-
judges-order-a-retrial-for-a-9-11-figure.html. 
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in the US as well as in Europe 4• According to Amnesty International the goal of 
suppressing terrorism has been used as a justi:fication "for laws and practices designed 
simply to stifte dissent and opposition" 5• Tolksdorf thus is not alone with this view, 
but shares his opinion with many of his European colleagues 6• His position as the 
presiding judge in the appeal against Mr Motassadeq's conviction provided him with 
a world-wide audience for the claim that even in a terrorist trial all evidence must 
be made available, including exonerating evidence. Some weeks before, the German 
Bundesgerichtshof had already acquitted Abdelghani Mzoudi, the second suspect to 
be tried for involvement in the 9/11 attacks, of accessory to murder and membership 
in Al Qaeda, namely because, as one of the judges put it, the evidence was not enough 
to convict him 7• 
In Europe, the prevailing view is that a justice system cannot bend to accommodate 
security concerns, not even those of international e:fforts to fight terrorism: "We cannot 
abandon the rule of law. That would be the beginning of a fatal development and 
ultimately a victory for terrorists" 8• Tue reality of criminal justice systems, however, 
changed after 9/11 9• Most countries introduced special laws against terrorists 10• 
Traditional international cooperation was modi:fied and new transnational frameworks 
were established 11 - all sharing a common goal: the fight against terrorism. 
My assignment for this publication is a critical evaluation of the changes brought 
by two relevant EU Framework Decisions: · 
FD from 2002 on combating terrorism 12; 
4 R BossoNG, "Tue Action Plan on Combating Terrorism", JCMS, 2008, p. 27-48, atp. 30, 
34 and 42; C. FIJNAUT, "The attacks on 11 September 2001, and the Immediate Response ofthe 
European Union and the United States", in J. WouTERS and F. NAERT ( eds.), Legal instruments in 
the fight against international terrorism. A transatlantic dialogue, Leiden/Boston, Nijhoff, 2004, 
p. 15-36, at p. 22-26; E. GUILD, op. cit., at p. 178-182; V. MrTSILEGAs, "Transatlantic Counter-
Terrorism Cooperation after Lisbon", Eucrim, 2010, p. 111-117, at p. 111-113; J. WoUTERS and 
F. NAERT, "Of Arrest Warrants, Terrorist Offences and Extradition Deals", Common Market 
Law Review, 2004, p. 909-935, at p. 909-911. 
5 REPORT OF AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, "Human Rights Dissolving at the Borders? Counter-
Terrorism and EU Criminal Law", Amnesty International EU Office, IOR 61/013/2005, p. 1-44, 
at p. 2, at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Aireport.pdf. 
6 See e.g. S. GLEss discussing C. FDNAUT. 
7 New York Times, 6 February 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/06/world/ 
faulting-us-germany-frees-a-9-11-suspect.html?ref=abdelghanimzoudi; for a more detailed 
discussion of the relevant German legal framework, see C. SAFFERLING, "Terror and Law - Is the 
German Legal System able to deal with terrorism?", German Law Journal, 2004, p. 515-524. 
8 New York Times, 5 March 2004. 
9 R BossoNG, op. cit.; C. FIJNAUT, "Tue attacks on 11 September 2001". 
10 See Martin Böse's and Robert Kert's country reports within this same publication. 
11 M. DEN BoER, C. HILLEBRAND andA. NöLKE, "Legitimacy under Pressure: Tue European 
Web ofCounter-Terrorism Networks", JCMS, 2008, p. 101-124, at p. 109-115; J. WoUTERS and 
F. NAERT, op. cit., p. 910-913. 
12 Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ, no. L 164, 22 June 
2002, p. 3. 
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FD from 2008 amending 2002 FD on combating terrorism 13 • 
Drafted and adopted in Brussels, published in the EU Official Journal some years 
ago, the two legal acts, hardly appear as documents of a wild unjust war. · 
But in the legal profession critics are not so easily appeased, and thus I keep with 
my assignment for this publication and take a critical approach. I will discuss four 
objections against the Framework Decisions: 
their definition of terrorism, 
the duty to punish ( on the ground of imprecise EU parameters ), 
the obligation to expand Member States' jurisdiction, 
and the possible infringements on human rights. 
2. EU-Framework in general 
To combat terrorism is high on the EU agenda today 14• Even before the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 the Commission had launched work on European 
legislation targeting terrorist crimes 15 • After the outrages in the US the initiatives 
for Framework Decisions de:fined terrorism and gave punishment parameters to the 
Member States as well as they established a more efficient cooperation, among other 
things, by introducing the European arrest warrant, which by now basically replaces 
traditional extradition procedures between the Member States. Several other legal 
acts followed 16• Tue listing of terrorists, the freezing of their property without 
legal remedies or fair trial guarantees led to well-known and interesting case law 
establishing principles of due process 17• Today legal instruments giving access to 
data exchange basis when pursuing terrorists are of high priority in practice 18• 
13 Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA amending Framework Decision on combating 
terrorism, OJ, no. L 330, 9 December 2008, p. 21. 
14 See for instance V.V. RAM:RAJ, M. HoR and K. ROACH (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law 
and Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 444-447. 
15 E.J. HusAB0 and I. BRUCE, Fighting Terrorism through Multilevel Criminal Legislation, 
Security council Resolution 1337, the EU Framework Decision an Combating Terrorism and 
their Implementation in Nordic, Dutch and German Criminal Law, Leiden/Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, p. 55-56. 
16 J. WoUTERS and F. NAERT, op. cit., p. 911-915; V. MrTSILEGAS, "Tue Third Wave ofThird 
Pillar Law", European Law Review, 2009, p. 523-560, at p. 538-542. 
17 See e.g. ECJ, 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Commission 
and Council v. Kadi; CFI, 11 June 2009, T-318/01, Commisston. and Council v. Omar; ECJ, 29 
June 2010, Judgment C-550/09, E. and F.; see G. DE BURCA, "The European Court of Justice 
and the International Legal Order After Kadi", Harvard International Law Journal, 2010, p. 1-
50; S. GLEss and D. SCHAFFNER, "Judicial review of freezing orders due to a UN listing by 
European Courts", in S. BRAUM and A. WEYE:tv!BERGH ( eds. ), Le · controle juridictionnel dans 
l 'espace penal europeen/The judicial control in EU cooperation in criminal matters, Bruxelles, 
2009, p. 163-193; E. GUILD, "Tue Uses and Abuses of Counter.:.Terrorism Policies in Europe: 
Tue Case of the 'Terrorist Lists"', op. cit., p. 173-193. 
18 V. MrTSILEGAS, "Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation", op. cit. ; K.L. ScHEPPELE, 
"Other People's PATRIOT Acts: Europe's Response to September 11", Loyola Law Review, 
2004, p. 89-148, atp. 89. 
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In practice there have been cases in which prosecutions on terrorist charges were 
received by the public with disbelief or rather discontent. 
InAustria law enforcement authorities brought charges against animal activists for 
being part of a criminal conspiracy, arguing that both mainstream and militant groups 
were part of a criminal conspiracy - not because of their actions, but because of their 
beliefs in support of animal rights- and that they should therefore be held responsible 
for a wide range of crimes committed in the name of animal rights. Although the 
activists were acquitted eventua1ly, doubts about the feasibility and adequacy of 
such legislation prevail - and were recently fuelled after law enforcement authorities 
prosecuted a member of an association of fathers fighting for changes in family law. 
This blurring distinction between terrorists and activists has also been the subject 
of discussion in Great Britain, where courts were faced with the question of whether 
planning terrorism against undemocratic and tyrannical regimes can be excused as a 
noble cause. In R v. F, a Libyan national, whose family was allegedly murdered by 
or on behalf of Gaddafi's regime, was granted asylum in the UK in 2003. In 2006, he 
was arrested and charged under the UK Terrorism Act (2000) for being in possession 
of two documents that could be used to further terrorist activities. He denied ever 
having seen one of the documents but said that the other one was given to him by 
the leader of a resistance movement in Libya opposed to Gaddafi. His argument was 
that he was a freedom fighter against a tyrannical government arid he therefore had 
a 'reasonable excuse' as set out in Section 58(3) of the Terrorism Act (2000). The 
judges held that being a 'freedom :fighter' is not a defense stating, " ... the terrorist 
legislation applies to countries which are govemed by tyrants and dictators. There is 
no exemption from criminal liability for terrorist activities which are motivated or said 
to be morally justified by the alleged nobility of the terrorist cause" 26 • The recent 
wave of revolutions in -the Arab world has led to the fall of tyrant regimes, paving 
the way for these countries to enjoy the freedoms enjoyed by others in democratic 
regimes such as that of the UK. Therefore, one cannot help by wonder if the courts in 
Great Britain will still uphold this judgment in light of the Arab spring. 
A definition detached from any reference to values (like democracy or Rechtsstaat) 
or reasons for committing the terrorist act (like freedom :fighting) leads to problems 
if a State wishes - maybe for good reasons - not to condemn certain violent acts as 
terrorist acts. This problem gets worse as a trigger mechanism for a duty to criminalize 
"terrorism" is set by superior law, like in the EU. This means that States cannot react 
individually to the particular challenges that they as individual States may face, such 
as the existence of anational political movement which has members who may resort 
to violence in an attempt to achieve their ends. 
Some examples, drawn from the list of Nobel peace laureates, illustrate the 
problem of individuals perceived by some States to be pursuing an illegal cause, and 
who could even be defined as "terrorists". They include i.e. Menachem Begin (head 
oflrgun Tzwai Le'umi, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978); Yassir Arafat (for 
belonging to the PLO, and a Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1994); Nelson Mandela (for 
belonging to the ANC, equally a Nobel Peace Prize winner). 
26 [2007] 2 All ER 193, [2007] EWCA Crim 243, [2007] 3 WLR 164. 
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Today however, the discussion about drawing the line between legitimate freedom 
:fighters and terrorists is replaced by the functional approach oflooking at the actions 
as such 27• 
3. Terrorist acts 
InArticle 1(1) of the 2002 FD, speci:fied acts which are criminal are defined :first. 
These include attacks upon persons' lives or their physical integrity, kidnapping or 
hostage taking, or interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any 
other fundamental resource the effect of which is to endanger human life, etc. 
Whereas the 2002 FD only obliged Member States to punish a rather limited 
number of acts linked to terrorist activities in its Art. 3, such as aggravated theft 
committed with a view to facilitate terrorist acts, extortion committed with a view 
to the perpetration of terrorist acts, the drawing up of false administrative documents 
with a view to committing terrorist acts the 2008 FD broadened the obligation to 
include several more acts linked to terrorist activities or rather to prepare, organise or 
supporting terrorism, such as: 
a. "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" - meaning distributing, or 
otherwise making available, a message to the public, with the intent to incite the 
commission of a terrorist act; 
b. "recruitment for terrorism" - meaning to solicit another person to commit a 
terrorist act; 
c. "training for terrorism" - meaning to provide instruction in the making or use 
of explosives, :firearms or other weapons or noxious or hazardous substances, or 
instructing individuals in other speci:fic methods or techniques, for the purpose of 
committing a terrorist act. 
Since the crime of terrorism itself is not defined in the EU framework, the 2008 
FD effectively bases broadly phrased subsidiary offences for which terrorism remain 
inchoate 28• During the legislative procedure several members of the European 
Parliament as well as members of national parliaments ofEU Member States criticised 
the vagueness of the elements of the new offences 29• 
The amendment of the former Framework Decision was made, especially to 
include ·incitement to terrorism on the Internet 30• The World Wide Web however 
brings together people (and jurisdictions) with quite diverging concepts of "public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence" or "incitement to terrorism". Thus, a legal 
obligation to prosecute such behaviour must be well refiected in terms of legitimate 
jurisdiction. A possible solution would be the supply ~f speci:fic definitions of the 
27 S. KlRscH and A. ÜEHMICHEN, "Judges gone astray: Tue fabrication of terrorism as an 
international crime by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon", Durham Law Review Online, 2011, 
p. 1-20, atp. 11-13. 
28 
REPORT OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, op. cit., p. 2. 
29 L. MaLINGER, "Illusion of Security: Why the Amended EU Framework Decision 
Criminalizing 'Incitementto Terrorism' on the IntemetFails to DefendEurope from Terrorism", 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 2010, p. 339-368, at p. 354. 
30 Jbid., p. 340-341. 
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outlawed behaviour. Otherwise the burden of defining the concepts will be on the 
national criminal courts and balancing the need for criminal prosecution with the right 
offree speech and other democratic freedoms 31 • 
Moreover, the obligation to prosecute exists even if a terrorist offence was never 
actually committed in the end. This is provided for in Art. 3(3) ofthe 2008 FD. Art. 4 
obliges Member States to punish the aiding or abetting, inciting or the attempt to 
commit terrorist acts. 
Thus Member States' obligation to punish is quite broad and rather vague, and 
it appears unclear how national legislators will implement the EU parameters into 
national law. 
B. Terrorism in (customary) international law- and the ''just war" argument 
Did the EU lawmaker fall short in his duty to provide a comprehensive de:finition 
- or is the task of de:fining punishable terrorism (as opposed to justi:fied freedom 
:fighting) an unanswerable dilemma? 
The de:finition of terrorism has been in law j ournal 's headlines recently 32 following 
the decision handed down by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which - among other 
things - de:fined terrorism as a crime according to customary international law 33, 
and thus in principle binding for all States, including EU Member States 34• 
According to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon rules of international law de:fine 
terrorism as follows: the commission of a criminal act causing harm to life, limb 
and property, including a concrete threat or an attempt 35 to commit such an act, 
as the only objective element of the offence 36• Many academics still hold the 
view that currently no universal de:finition of terrorism exists 37• This position is 
31 Jbid., p. 360-363. 
32 K. AMBos, "Judicial creativity at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of 
Terrorism under International Law?", Leiden Journal of International Law, 2011, p. 655-675, 
atp. 655; s. Krn.sCH andA. OEHMICHEN, op. cit., p. l. 
33 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/I/AC/R.176bis, 16 February 2011 ('Decision'), 
nos. 85 and 102. 
34 Whether the tribunal's judges were right to press ahead with a de:finition in the case 
before them, maybe left open here. Fora critique see K. AMBos, op. cit., p. 665-666; S. Krn.sCH 
andA. OEHMICHEN, op. cit., p. 6-7. 
35 Art. 2(2) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Al 
RES/52/164 of 15 Dec. 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S 256; Art. 2(3) International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, A/Res/54/109 of 9 Dec. 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270; 
Art. l(a) Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 Dec. 1970, 860 
U.N.T.S. 106; Art. 2(1)(d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, 14 Dec. 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 168; all conventions can be 
found at [www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml]. 
36 Interlocutory Decision, no. 188. 
37 E.g. K. AMBos, op. cit., p. 666; E. STUBBINS BATES et al., Terrorism and International 
Law: Accountability, Remedies, and Reform: a Report of the !BA Task Force an Terrorism, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 1; M. Ch. BAssmUNI, "Terrorism: the Persistent 
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exempli:fied by Schmid and Jongman 38 who have analysed 109 different de:finitions 
of terrorism and isolated 22 different elements characterising terrorism. Later, in a 
report, Schmid suggested a de:finition of terrorism, which has latterly become famous 
due to its simplicity: acts of terrorism are de:fined as 'peacetime equivalents of war 
crimes' 39• This de:finition blurs again how:ever the legal parameters of such crimes, 
some of which are to be prosecuted as crimes in a national criminal justice systems 
and some of which, the more serious ones, which shall be taken care of by the nascent 
international criminal justice systems, or even outside of the criminal justice system 
altogether by triggering a reaction based on international humanitarian law. 
Part of the dilemma terrorism poses to legal systems is that of drawing lines 
between criminal law measures and responses that may be labeled either as military or 
humanitarian interventions. Both of these forms of intervention lie beyond the scope 
of national criminal justice systems, and carry the risk of being viewed as acts of 
terrorism themselves. 
The 2002 FD on combating terrorism deals with this paradox also, albeit only 
marginally: Recital 11 of the preamble asserts, that "Actions by armed forces during 
periods of armed conflicts, which are governed by international humanitarian law 
within the meaning of these terms under that law ... cannot be viewed as terrorism". 
Ultimately, this exemption clause is based on a ''.just war" argument, too. The law 
makes the assumption that certain circumstances may exempt violence from the legal 
range ofterrorism. Violence which could under different circumstances be considered 
to be an act of terrorism is defined into a certain act of freedom :fighting 40• 
References to the "just war" argument have dominated political discussions 
mainly regarding the :fight against terrorism, especially in the US, with regard to 
Al-Qaeda 41• A reference to the ''.just war" argument in legal documents governing 
the States' reactions to terrorism provoke however a series of questions, including: 
May such a principle be applied to (politically motivated) violence at all? If this 
is answered in the affirmative, certain justi:fications could be invoked to transform 
violence from an evil to a non-evil-action. Not only States themselves are provided 
with some protections in this way insofar as State intervention is exempted from any 
terrorism charge without further question, hut also other groups or individuals as well. 
Dilemma of Legitimacy", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2004, p. 299-
306, atp. 305; S. Krn.scH andA. 0EHMICHEN, op. cit., p. 7-8. 
38 A.P. SCHMID and A.J. JoNGMAN, Political Terrorism - a New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Amsterdam/New Brunswick, 2nd ed., 1988, 
p. 5-8. 
39 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Definitions of Terrorism, at http://web. 
archive.org/web/2007052 7145 632/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism _ de:finitions.html, 
last visited on 27 April 2011. 
40 S. PEERS, "EU Responses to Terrorism", International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 
2003, p. 227-243, at p. 236-238. · 
41 See also A. 0EHMICHEN, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The Terrorised 
Legislator? A Comparison of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Its Implications an Human 
Rights in the Legal Systems of the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France, Antwerp, 
Intersentia, 2009, p. 389 and f. 
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How these exemption clauses can be accommodated within the wider fight against 
terrorism and whether they simply open a Pandora's box of difficulties remain moot 
questions. 
4. Fighting terrorism by means of criminal law 
lt would nevertheless be unfair to judge eff orts designed to fight terrorism by 
means ofthe criminal law, like those foreseen in the EU-FrameworkDecisions, solely 
on the fact that they do not solve the historically di:fficult distinction between terrorism 
and :freedom fighting. Criticism should rather focus on the special use of criminal 
law in a certain system, like that established by the Framework Decisions or in the 
national criminal justice systems of the Member States 42• 
The EU act basically does two things: (a) compel Member States to punish 
certain acts, and (b) force Member States to claim wide jurisdiction in order to ensure 
prosecution. These obligations correspond in general with the demands of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, which deduced :from rules of international law two obligations 
on States and non-State actors: (1) the obligation to re:frain :from engaging in acts of 
terrorism, and (2) the obligation to prevent and repress terrorism, and in particular to 
prosecute and try alleged perpetrators 43 • 
A. Obligation to punish 
The Framework Decisions - as explained above - oblige Member States to punish 
certain behaviour as terrorist acts. This fact can be interpreted qujte differently: lt 
could be viewed as progress towards a united :fight against terrorism or as an EU 
infringement on State sovereignty and a violation of a democratically legitimized 
law. 
The duty to criminalize, established by the Framework Decisions, is quite broad 
- as illustrated previously - especially if one bends the rather imprecise language 
to encompass all its possible meanings, for instance when criminalizing acts of 
preparation and/ or conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism 44• 
The EU obligation is thus problematic, taking into account the basic question 
of a European competence to define criminal terrorist acts in the first place and the 
Framework Decision's failure to :frame punishable terrorist activities in a precise 
language 45• Nonetheless, in attempting to come up with de:finitions it is important 
to keep in mind - as the German Bundesverfassungsgericht phrased it in its 2009 
Lisbon Judgement - that: "decisions on substantive and formal criminal law are 
42 Fora comparative overview see: A. ÜEHMICHEN, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation, 
op. cit.; E.J. HusAB0/LBRUCE, op. cit., p. 171-192. 
43 Interlocutory Decision, no. 102. 
44 For critical views see e.g. S. MELANDER, "The Use of Criminal Law in Combating 
Terrorism - a Nordic Perspective", in K LIGETI (ed.), Homage to Imre A. Wiener, Toulouse, 
Eres, 2010, p. 119-135, p. 121-123. 
45 A. KLIP, op. cit., p. 200; s. PEERS, op. cit., p. 230-232. 
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particularly important to the ability of a constitutional State to democratically shape 
its laws" 46• 
However, seven years earlier, the 2002 FD set out to compel Member States to 
punish certain acts of "terrorism" on the grounds of EU parameters laid out in the 
Framework Decision. And, this Framework Decision does not meet in all aspects 
the requirements of precise language and coherent concepts that govern most of the 
different Member States' criminal justice systems. 
One must furthermore always keep in mind the fact that, in practice, the importance 
of anti-terrorist legislation is often not the elements of crime that it de:fines, but the 
special investigative methods or other measure provided to deal with it 47• Neither of 
these aspects are however laid down in the EU-Framework Decisions. 
B. Expansion of jurisdiction 
The EU-Framework Decisions also oblige the Member States to expand their 
criminal jurisdiction. According to Art. 9 of the 2002 FD on combating terrorism, 
each Member State shall take the necessary measures to establish 
territorial jurisdiction ( extending the concept to vessels :flying its flag and aircraft 
registered there ), 
jurisdicti(?n based on a broad concept of the active personality principle (including 
acts committed by "residents" and legal persons as well as citizens) and 
jurisdiction based on a broad concept of the protective principle, where acts are 
committed "against the institutions or people" of that Member State or an EU 
institution or body based there. 
Given that EU-Member states have not yet settled on a legal act which allocates 
clear-cut jurisdiction to one EU-state in cases o(a positive competence conflict, the 
obligation to expand jurisdiction and potentially intensify the problem of multiple 
jurisdictions is striking 48. 
C. Infringements ofhuman rights? 
In addition, anti-terrorist legislation always raises concerns about the adequate 
protection ofhuman rights and civil liberties 49; this is especially true in an atmosphere 
of ''war against terrorism" 50• 
46 BVerfG, 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 
1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09, no. 252 at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ 
es20090630 _2bve000208en.html. 
47 A. ÜEHMICHEN, "Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of Reactive Anti-
terror Legislation and Long-term Consequences", German Law Journal, 2008, p. 855-887; 
s. PEERS, op. cit., p. 237-243. . 
48 See E.J. HusAB0II.BRUCE, op. cit., p. 315-357. 
49 A. ÜEHMICHEN, Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation, op. cit., p. 343 and f; E. GUILD, 
op. cit.,p.174-175. 
50 See e.g. F.D. Nf AoLAIN, "Looking Ahead: Strategie Priorities and Challenges for the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 
2004, p. 469-491, at p. 487-491. 
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The European authorities have however realised by now that respect for human 
rights adds to the legitimacy of the fight against terrorism, and thus strive for 
compliance with human rights as well as spreading respect of human rights in order to 
ensure that there is a sound basis for cooperation with third countries. 
On the face of it, such concem seems unnecessary anyway, since Art. 2 of the 
2008 FD explicitly declares that: "[The] Framework Decision shall not have the 
e:ffect of requiring Member States to take measures in contradiction of fundamental 
principles relating to :freedom of expression, in particular :freedom of the press and the 
:freedom of expression in other media as they result from constitutional traditions or 
rules goveming the rights and responsibilities of, and the procedural guarantees for, 
the press or other media where these rules relate to the determination or limitation of 
liability." 
The legal e:ffect and impact of Art. 2 of the 2008 FD in a particular case remains 
nonetheless somewhat unclear. Could a defendant raise an objection based on an 
infringement of Art. 2 of the 2008 FD? Or could a Member State raise, for instance, a 
reservation of national :freedom of expression if its national criminal laws were to be 
screened before the ECJ because the penal statutes against terrorism were judged too 
lenient from a Brussels point of view? 
Before the 2008 amendment, the 2002 FD on combating terrorism only stated in 
its preamble that the Union is "based on the principle of democracy and the principle 
of the rule of law" and that the Framework Decision "respects fundamental rights" 
as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Member 
States" constitutions and observes the principle recognised by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, agreed in December 2000 51 • 
Tue European Court of Human Rights (Eur. Court HR) has however rejected the 
invoking of human rights protections to justify violent political acts committed in the 
territory of signatory States to the European Convention on Human Rights in general: 
Given that all of them are considered to be democratic countries, and have made a 
commitment to human rights protection, political violence may be treated like any 
other serious criminal o:ffence 52• However in recent judgements the European Court 
of Human Rights has been firm in Human Rights protection as regards of certain 
consequences like preventive detention as well as deportation or expulsion of terrorist 
suspects, if they cannot be convicted in a criminal trial 53• Thus the FD's parameters 
for substantive criminal law should only raise concem with regard to the incrimination 
of non-violent actions, such as alleged recruitment for terrorism in certain situations, 
which touch upon the freedom of association, the :freedom of speech and expression 
51 The preamble further asserts that the Framework Decision could not be interpreted 
to "reduce or restrict fundamental rights or :freedom such as the right to strike, freedom of 
assembly, of association and of expression, including the right of everyone to form and join 
trade unions ... and the related right to demonstrate". 
52 See furthermore Eur. Court HR, 18 January 1978, Ireland v. UK, no. 5310/71; Eur. 
Court HR, 27 September 1995, McCann and Others v. UK, no. 18984/91. 
53 See e.g. Eur. Court HR, 19 February 2009, A. and Others v. UK, no. 3455/05; or Eur. 
Court HR, 28 February 2008, Saadi v. Italy, no. 37201/06; or Eur. Court HR, 24 March 2009, 
Ben Salah v. Italy, no. 38128/06. 
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as well as on the principle of legal certainty 54• But there is still little relevant case 
law up to now. 
Counter terrorism legislation often collides with the right to :freedom of speech 
because it often seeks to suppress certain politically motivated acts 55• Furthermore, 
terrorism, or rather the fear of terrorism, is also often used to justify the use of special 
police and prosecution powers that reduce the usual protection of fair trial guarantees 
relating to investigations, detention, and criminal proceedings 56• Both are highly 
problematic from a human rights perspective. 
European countries basically have abstained from the "war on terrorism" -
terminology. Tue common understanding is that societies have to balance the need 
for criminal prosecution and democratic entitlements, especially the right of free 
speech 57• These privileges are legally grounded in the Art. 10 ECHR as well as in 
Art. 19 ICCPR and Art. 20 ICCPR (International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights). Both grant the right of :freedom of thought and expression, giving the 
individual the right to have an opinion and voice it without govemment intrusion 58• 
The exercise of these rights, however, may be subject to such limitations as are lawful 
in a democratic society in order to protect national society and public safety. 
5. Conclusion 
The EU-Framework Decisions provide the grounds on which Member States 
have, at least partly, built their national criminal sanctions against terrorism. In doing 
so, legislators - at the European and the State level - have had to create systems which 
allow them to fight violent attacks e:ffectively, avoiding unwanted consequences on 
other levels. 
Basically the criminaljustice systems face two problems: (a) Criminal prosecution 
and warfare instruments must be kept separately, i.e. as long as terrorism is regarded 
a crime, all alleged terrorists must be treated lik-e alleged criminals and have the basic 
rights of criminal suspects; (b) criminal justfoe systems must draw an adequate line 
between those groups advancing legitimate political goals with controversial means 
54 Eur. Court HR, 26 April 1979, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, no. 6538/74; Eur. Court 
HR, 30 January 1998, United Communist Party v. Turkey, 133/1996/752/951; Eur. Court HR, 
13 February 2003, Welfare Party v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98. 
55 See e.g. F.D. NiAoLAlN, op. cit, p. 489-491; S. DouGLAs-Scorr, "The Rule ofLaw in the 
European Union- putting the security into the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice", 
European Law Review, 2004, p. 219-242, at p. 221-224. 
56 See judgments regarding infiltration of undercover agents in terrorist organisation -
Eur. Court HR, 5 February 2008, Ramanauskas v. Lithuania, no. 74420/01; or Eur. Court HR, 
10 March 2009, Bykovv. Russia, no. 4378/02-which are onlylegitimate ifthere is an adequate 
legal base and a guarantee of supervision of independent authority as well as a clear distinction 
between identifying perpetrators and inciting an innocent person; regarding collection and 
automatic procession of data ( data mining), see Eur. Court HR, 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, 
no. 28341/95; and Eur. Court HR, 4 December 2008, S. and Marper v. UK (DNA storage), nos. 
30562/04, 30566/04. 
57 L. MELLINGER, op. cit., at p. 360-365. 
58 C. BRANTs and S. FRANKEN, "The protection of fundamental human rights in criminal 
process Generalreport", Utrecht Law Review, 2009, p. 7-65, at p. 28-29. 
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and those which have crossed the line, not only propagating illegitimate political 
goals, but using punishable means. 
Addressing the problem, the European legislator has different possibilities: 
To solve the first problem, requirements for phrasing the statutes incriminating 
terrorism could be modified in a way that ":freedom activists" could be exempted, for 
instance by way of a negative definition entered. § 278( c )(3) of the Austrian Criminal 
Code provides an example for such exemption: According to that statute a violent act 
is not judged as terrorist act, if the aim is to establish or reconstitute democratic or 
constitutional power or to protect human rights 59• 
Another way out of a terrorist verdict could be the acknowledgement of "good 
cause" as an exceptional justification or excuse. Tue result is very similar as if the 
statute would itself carry an exemption clause. For reasons of criminal doctrine 
however it is different, whether there is no "legal wrong" (" Unrechf ') committed or if 
a "legal wrong" is by way of exception justified or excused. 
A third potential way to avoid unwanted terrorist charges could be a mechanism 
to drop charges if the prosecuting authorities or the courts realize that terrorist laws 
are applied in a case of legitimate :freedom fighting or political activism of the "good 
sort". 
Tue need for an outlet is obvious in the 2002 FD itself, namely in the exemption 
clause based on a ''just war" argument: Tue assumption that certain circumstances 
may in fact transform violence from what may otherwise be considered to be an act of 
terrorism into an act of freedom fighting 60• References to the ''just war"-argument 
have dominated political discussions, especially in the US, with regard to Al-Qaeda. 
But Europe hopefully will not follow the example and construe criminal prosecution 
as warfare. 
59 § 278(c)(3) StGB: "(3) Die Tat gilt nicht als terroristische Straftat, wenn sie auf die 
Herstellung oder Wiederherstellung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Verhältnisse oder die 
Ausübung oder Wahrung von Menschenrechten ausgerichtet ist" at http://www.internet4jurists. 
at/gesetze/bg_ stgbO 1.htm#%C2%A 7 _ 170. 
60 S. PEERS, op. cit., p. 236. 
